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Abstract 
In the fifteenth century, the Mediterranean world was in turmoil. A new sultan, Mehmet II, had just in-
herited a vast empire stretching over two continents in the centre of which the ruins of the Byzantine 
Empire survived through the city of Constantinople. In order to seal his accession, he therefore under-
took important preparations to conquer the “City guarded by God”. Mehmet then ordered the construc-
tion, within 4 months, of an imposing fortress nicknamed Boǧazkesen (the throat cutter). This coup de 
force is a testimony to the incredible military and economic power of this growing empire that masters a 
new war technology: artillery. The Ottomans, who were still novices in this field, had therefore had to 
adapt their fortifications to the use of firearms. Using local and foreign architects and engineers, the Ot-
toman fortifications built in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries bear witness to an architectural experi-
mentation that seems to testify, like the work carried out in Rhodes by Pierre d’Aubusson or in Methoni 
by the Venetians, to a real research in terms of offensive and defensive effectiveness. In this context, the 
fortifications of Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı, built on either side of the narrowest point of the 
Bosporus in 1451-1452, are characterized by the presence of large coastal batteries that operate together. 
They were to block access to Constantinople by the Black Sea, combining sinking and dismasting fire.  




The spread of firearms modify the architectural 
conventions. From a structural point of view, 
the fortifications must guard against this new 
weapon, which during the following centuries, 
becomes more and more effective. Architects 
must also open shooting ranges and find sites 
to house heavy muzzle-loading weapons. Thus 
from the advent of Mehmet II, a new offensive 
architectural style was created with the con-
struction in 1452 of Rumeli Hisarı and Anado-
lu Hisarı, two forts at sea established on either 
side of the narrowest point of the Bosporus. 
For the first time, fortifications totally integrate 
artillery in their structure, to fight against the 
on-board artillery of the war ships and this, 50 
years before the French answers in Toulon 
(1515) or Le Havre (1517), 60 years before the 
construction of the Megalos Kules (1524) in 
Heraklyon by the Venetians, and 75 years be-
fore the forts at the sea of Henry VIII of Eng-
land.  
2. The Bosporus Strait 
The Bosporus Strait connects the Black Sea to 
the Aegean Sea. It is part of the Turkish Strait 
System (TSS) which also includes the Marma-
ra Sea and the Dardanelles Strait further south. 
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This inlet, which looks like a river with a 
winding course between two fairly high banks, 
is about 30 km long. It runs north/south from 
Istanbul to Beykoz, then follows a first bend to 
the northwest for about 4 km at Sariyer, before 
returning to its original orientation to the Black 
Sea (Fig. 1). 
The southern mouth of the channel, almost 
3500 m wide, receives to the west, a vast estu-
ary 7 km long, called the Golden Horn, before 
gradually narrowing to 860 m, between Rumeli 
Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı. The canal widens 
again to 1500 m and opens into a funnel to-
wards the Black Sea.  
To understand the hydrological characteristics 
of the Strait, we must consider it as a whole. 
The configuration of the two sea basins (Black 
Sea/Marmara Sea) connected by the strait has a 
strong asymmetry. Many rivers supply the 
Black Sea directly or indirectly. The latter then 
discharges its overflow towards the Mediterra-
nean, by a very powerful surface current, gen-
erally from the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea. 
This force varies according to the width of the 
strait and the irregular shape of the coastline so 
that too much advance projects the flow to-
wards the opposite shore at a very steep angle. 
The intensity of the current is also affected by 
fluctuations in winds blowing in the same tra-
jectory as the channel, most often from north 
to south. Topographical and climatic con-
straints continuously impose powerful currents 
which, unlike the Dardanelles in calm weather, 
remain extremely fast. These physical charac-
teristics dictate difficult conditions for naviga-
tion. Boats had to negotiate the routes accord-
ing to the sudden changes in current orienta-
tion along the inlet, while the frequent fogs 
provided additional discomfort. 
Due to its configuration, the Bosporus Strait 
was a major crossing point; first as an im-
portant maritime communication route be-
tween the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, but 
also as an intercontinental transit route be-
tween Asia and Europe.  
 
Fig. 1. Bosporus Strait (Vincent Ory, 2019). 
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The Ottomans settled permanently on the east-
ern coast of the Bosporus during the fourteenth 
century. In 1394, Bayezid I Yıldırım, under-
took the siege of Constantinople. More or less 
before the outbreak of hostilities, he ordered 
the construction of the Gözluce Hisarı fortress 
at the mouth of the Göksü River on the eastern 
bank of the Bosporus, 10 km north of Istanbul. 
The latter was to secure the intercontinental 
transit route that would allow its troops to 
cross the strait and maintain communication 
with Ottoman forces operating on the Europe-
an coast. Bayezid, like his successors, did not 
have a sufficiently efficient fleet to ensure and 
perpetuate the crossing of the strait.  
Mehmet II enlarged Gözluce Hisarı in 1452, 
and in the same year, on the European side of 
the Bosphorus, launched the construction of 
the imposing Rumeli Hisarı fortress opposite 
the first one. They had to prevent any supply 
of the city by Christian ships in the Black Sea, 
and to do so had been considerably provided 
with artillery. 
However, the system does not seem to have 
had, at least initially, the expected effective-
ness. On November 10th, 1452, the garrison of 
Rumeli Hisarı opened fire on two Venetian 
galleys from the Pontic region, which managed 
to pass. Undoubtedly, the novelty of this sys-
tem explained this first failure, and perhaps it 
was necessary to make some adjustments be-
fore Antonio Erizzio’s ship was sunk on No-
vember 26th of the same year. 
The two forts at sea finally had an economic 
interest. By blocking the strait, the Sultan had 
also taken control of the only seaway leading 
to the Black Sea and its riches. All types of 
ships, whether commercial, military or private, 
and of any nationality, foreign or even Turkish, 
had to pay a tax that was an important source 
of income for the empire.  
When in 1484, the Black Sea became an “Ot-
toman Sea”, the fortresses lost their military 
importance and were converted into prisons. 
3. Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı : a dam 
on the Bosporus 
While there does not seem to be any document 
preserved in the Ottoman archives that would 
allow us to date the construction of Rumeli 
Hisarı and the expansion of Anadolu Hisarı 
with any precision, the many testimonies and 
chronicles from the time Constantinople was 
taken provide valuable information (Déroche, 
Vatin, 2016). Thus it was possible to determine 
that the erection of the first one began in mid-
spring 1452 and was completed in August of 
the same year. 
Rumeli Hisarı was designed by Mehmet II, as-
sisted by the architect Müslihiddin and a monk 
converted to Islam. 
The context of this fortification campaign was 
clearly explained by Kritoboulos. The fortress-
es would, in fact, be advantageous for various 
reasons and would serve as a powerful support 
point for the siege of Constantinople that 
Mehmet was about to undertake. Their founda-
tion thus appears as the prologue to the fall of 
the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, they had first 
to isolate the city of Black Sea by the Bosporus 
by sinking any ship that tried to force the strait. 
But if the primary purpose of these forts at sea 
had been to stifle Constantinople, cut off from 
the pontic supply, it is nevertheless certain that 
they were also intended to ensure communica-
tion between Europe and Asia, so that the West 
could not prevent Ottoman troops from cross-
ing it, as had been the case several times be-
fore. 
The fortress of Rumeli Hisarı1, in Europe, oc-
cupies the steep slope of the foothills of two 
hills overlooking the Bosporus, between which 
a small valley slopes gently to the sea. The ir-
regularity of the relief imposed an irregular po-
lygonal plane running from north to south over 
a length of about 250 m and a maximum width 
of 130 m. The complex is dominated by three 
autonomous master towers, occupying the 
peaks of the two hills and the centre of the val-
ley at its contact with the sea. A fourth, smaller 
“master” tower controls the southeast corner. 
They interrupted the entire enclosure, and 
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flanked by thirteen towers of various plans. 
Access to the fortress was through three doors 
in the curtains, respectively to the west, north 
and northeast, as well as through two potterns, 
systematically flanked by a tower. Inde-
pendently of the corps de place, a coastal bat-
tery or hisar peçe, wrongly named barbican by 
Albert Gabriel because of its wall pierced by a 
door placed in front of the northeast access, 
doubled the eastern enclosure along the shore. 
This one, now partially destroyed, had many 
shooting gates built at the level of the sea so 
that the shooting trajectories were perpendicu-
lar to the coastline. 
The fortress of Anadolu Hisarı2, in Asia, is 
characterized by a large square tower doubled 
to the south by a roughly quadrangular enclo-
sure flanked by four towers.  Built in the 
1390s, it occupies the top of a reef overlooking 
the mouth of the Göksü River. In 1452, 
Mehmet II added a polygonal enclosure 
flanked by three circular towers to the alluvial 
plain that had formed around the original site. 
Only the northeast quarter, with two doors, 
does not appear to have been washed by the 
water, while the western curtains had many 
shooting gates. The latter, arranged slightly 
above sea level, covered the strait at an angle 
of about 115°. The fortress’ largest dimensions 
were 70 m, from north to south, and 80 m from 
east to west. 
4.  Armament and action principle of forts  
It is difficult to know exactly the composition 
and layout of the armaments, particularly artil-
lery, when the fortresses are completed. The 
chronicles, despite their large number, because 
of this event considered by his contemporaries 
as exceptionally remarkable, are rarely so de-
tailed.  
Kritoboulos, one of the most singular eyewit-
nesses for his work dedicated to Mehmet II, 
reported that the site and programme had been 
chosen so that the structure had the widest pos-
sible width along the coast to place guns cov-
ering the sea. Then, he explained that at its 
completion Rumeli Hisarı was equipped with 
all kinds of weapons, and defensive equip-
ment. It was mainly equipped with “stone and 
catapult throwing machines” of all sizes –the 
largest, facing the sea, were massed on the 
ground along the entire length of the wall 
along the shoreline– suggesting that the order 
included both powder and mechanical artillery.  
Doukas claimed that bronze cannons threw 
stones of more than 600 pounds (about 294 kg) 
and had been installed in the Halil Paşa kulesi, 
while Nicolò Barbaro wrote that the fortress 
was firmly defended on the sea side by a very 
large number of bombards established on the 
coast and the ramparts. 
Tursun Bey, finally, was the only one to speak 
clearly of an advanced work on the water, 
pierced by twenty firing gates, in which very 
high-calibre pieces had been placed. He added 
that this device had also been built on the side 
of the “new fort located on the opposite bank” 
–Anadolu Hisarı– without however providing 
more details. 
On the other hand, Evliyâ Çelebi (1611-1682) 
gives figures and the type of artillery. Thus in 
Rumeli Hisarı it counted 105 pieces among 
which there were balyemez and şayka on the 
waterfront. But we do not know in what pro-
portion they arm the coastline. Nor does it pro-
vide any indication of Anadolu Hisarı’s ordo-
nance.  
In addition to this limited written information, 
there is a document of exceptional significance 
because it is probably the first representation 
of the Bosphorus fortifications. Preserved at 
the Biblioteca Trivulziana in Milan, in the co-
dex 64, Babinger believes that it was made by 
a Venetian spy around 1453 (Babinger, 1955, 
p. 190). There is clearly large artillery facing 
the sea perpendicular to the coastline. Unfortu-
nately, the annotations do not provide any fur-
ther details. 
he information provided by the written sources 
is therefore limited as regards the composition 
of the ordinance, but supplemented with the 
architectural study, it makes it possible to 





Fig. 2. Theoretical distribution of fire levels on the Rumeli Hisarı seafront (Vincent Ory, 2019).
It is therefore possible to suggest that the mari-
time front, which constitutes the offensive el-
ement of these fortresses, was the most heavily 
armed. A first shot of fire, at sea level, was 
armed with bronze cannons –probably of the 
balyemez and şayka type– firing 600 pound 
(about 294 kg) cannonballs on the southern 
portion and of a smaller calibre in the north. If 
the offensive character, at Anadolu Hisarı, 
seemed to be limited to this low battery, that of 
Rumeli Hisarı was doubled by a second shot of 
fire, apparently ensured by box bombards ar-
ranged at nearly 13 m above sea level. The lat-
ter was itself supported by an intermediate po-
sition established at an altitude of about 15 and 
17 m on the top terraces of the towers in the 
middle of the curtain wall. According to 
Kritoboulos, mechanical or kinetic artillery 
was also used to crown the enclosures and 
towers. A third level of fire was allowed by the 
terrace crowning the Kuçuk Zağanos Paşa ku-
lesi and probably by light artillery on the main 
terrace of Halil Paşa Kulesi which culminate 
respectively at 22,70 m and 26 m. A fourth 
plan was guaranteed by box bombards in-
stalled on the north curtain wall at mid-slope, 
which stood at 31,50 m, and by light artillery 
on the summit terrace of the Halil Paşa Kulesi. 
Finally, close defence was also provided by 
light artillery placed on the towers and proba-
bly by mechanical and powder handguns. 
If the location of Anadolu Hisarı had probably 
been dictated by two geographical parameters 
that would meet its supposed roles of securing 
the intercontinental transhipment point and 
protecting the mouth of the Göksü River, the 
choice made for the construction of Rumeli 
Hisarı would appear to be defined by other re-
quirements. Also, as Kritoboulos and Tursun 
Bey testify, particular attention has been paid 
to the characteristics of the currents. Mehmet 
II would have visited the canal with specialists 
to determine the areas that would present the 
greatest difficulties for navigation.  
The navigation conditions between Rumeli 
Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı are complicated 
due to a relatively strong current. Regardless 
of the wind direction, the flow invariably 
evolves from the Black Sea to the Marmara 
Sea. In most cases, it remains in the centre of 
the channel, but the arrangement of the points 
and curves on both sides of the channel is such 
that, in some places, the water is sometimes 
pushed towards the opposite coast with vio-
lence. Thus, when encountering the Asian 
coast at Kalinca, the current’s trajectory gradu-
ally moves towards the European coast and 
passes near Kayalar Burnu where Rumeli 
Hisarı is located at a speed of 5 to 6 knots.  
In this context, ships heading down to Con-
stantinople were exposed to extremely danger-
ous currents, so that “ships were thrown and 
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broken against the reefs if sailors did not pro-
vide care and experience”. Ships sailing to-
wards the Black Sea also had to deal with 
headwinds 
Thus, in the fifteenth century, naves and gal-
leys encountered difficulties in navigating the 
strait. Although the latter could row their way 
in, their shallow freeboard and shallow draught 
made them unstable in bad weather and ad-
verse conditions. The 1,20 m high waves were 
an almost insurmountable obstacle that could 
capsize them. In addition, since the cruising 
speed of propulsion by oars was about three 
knots during the day, halved at night, the gal-
leys had great difficulty maintaining a velocity 
that would allow them to cross the passage. 
The rigged ships had to follow particular tra-
jectories to benefit from the counter-currents 
and sail up the strait.  
The point chosen for the establishment of Ru-
meli Hisarı was therefore partly determined by 
the unfavourable navigation conditions there 
and by the distribution of surface currents 
whose main flow ran along the European 
coast. The addition of maritime batteries to the 
narrowest part of the channel therefore only 
increased the risk of shipwrecks, both for 
naves and galleys. The chronicles mentioned 
above, as well as the architectural analysis of 
the fortresses, suggest, in theory, the composi-
tion of the coastal batteries. Thus, Rumeli 
Hisarı was probably equipped with 16 giant 
bombards and 4 smaller ones, while Anadolu 
Hisarı had 9, probably of the same categories. 
Two of these unusual pieces, which were part 
of Rumeli Hisarı’s arsenal, are on display in 
front of the site, while a third is in the War 
Museum at İstanbul. They provide a glimpse 
of the type of weapon used. Weighing nearly 
fifteen tons, they fired 630 mm diameter stone 
balls weighing about 285 kg. Their maximum 
range, in comparison with the Dardanelles’ 
guns, was supposed to be close to 1200 m, 
while their effective range was certainly lower. 
However, even with a 50% reduction in the lat-
ter, European and Asian fire crossed in the 
middle of the channel since the strait is not 
Fig. 3. Theoretical fire plans of the fortresses of Rumeli Hisarı and Andolu Hisarı (Vincent Ory, 2019). 
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more than 830 m wide at this point. The ab-
sence of a trunnion and the presence of at-
tachment rings suggest that these bombards 
were placed on fixed mounts, so the angle of 
fire was not adjustable. In addition, the size 
and weight of the projectile resulted in an ex-
tremely slow firing rate, so that after the first 
firing, however destructive it may have been, 
these weapons could not be recharged quickly. 
Consequently, the garrison had to prepare them 
and wait for the target to pass in front of the 
gun to make a salvo. The importance of the 
calibre and the enormous crushing power of 
the stone balls thrown by the main battery 
bombards indicate that its role was clearly the 
firing to sink.  
The provision to Rumeli Hisarı of three addi-
tional fire plans on the waterfront curtains and 
on the terraces of the Halil Paşa Kulesi was 
certainly intended to destroy the rigging of 
naves, galleys and other sailing ships. They 
should therefore promote the use of scrap met-
al. The ordinances installed on the enclosure 
probably favoured direct fire, perpendicular to 
the axis of the walls, while the towers allowed 
the radiant fire to cover a larger area. There is 
no element to determine the characteristics of 
the gun supports and therefore their manoeu-
vrability, except on the north enclosure at mid-
slope where the provisions suggest the use of 
fixed supports placed directly on the ground.  
Powder artillery appears to have been support-
ed by mechanical artillery, referred to as cata-
pults, also positioned on towers and curtains. 
The maritime fronts of Rumeli Hisarı and 
Anadolu Hisarı were thus equipped with de-
vices that allowed parabolic or vertical firing. 
The layout of the two fortresses and the con-
figuration of the coastal batteries suggest that 
the two fortifications acted in a complementary 
manner to control the strait by crossing their 
fires. They combined the use of giant stone-
throwing bombards for sinking fire with lighter 
pieces on three superposed levels for dismast-
ing fire (Fig. 3).  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that these forts at 
sea are characteristic of this period of architec-
tural renewal linked to the massive use of artil-
lery, where the increase in the effective range 
of weapons now makes it possible to block and 
control previously uncontrollable traffic routes 
from the coast. With Anadolu Hisarı and Ru-
meli Hisarı built in 1451, Mehmet Fatih intro-
duced the concept of “double sea forts”, which 
he would perfect 10 years later on the Darda-
nelles. These forts were designed from the be-
ginning by two to operate in a coupled manner 
and increase the risk of sinking for the enemy 
by combining the sinking fire, and dismasting 
fire in areas where the sailing conditions were 
already dangerous and complicated. 
It is therefore necessary to specify that the for-
tress of Rumeli Hisarı, whose plan may seem 
illogical because of its location straddling a 
valley, must be approached as an element of 
protection for the coastal battery. It is the latter 
that must be established on the narrowest por-
tion of the strait. The monumental complex 
that dominates it is totally devoted to its de-
fence. 
In addition, the Ottomans appear to have been 
pioneers in this field by using principles that 
other nations seem to have used half a century 
later. Thus the arrangement of batteries estab-
lished on either side of a waterway was taken 
over by King Manuel I of Portugal to control 
access to Lisbon by sea with the construction 
of the Belem tower on the bank of the Tagus 
between 1514 and 1519.  The principle was 
taken up ten years later by the architects of 
Francis I of France when he built the Château 
d’If in front of Marseille in 1529.  
The forts at Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı 
seem to illustrate that under the reigns of 
Mehmet the Conqueror and Süleymân the 
Magnificent, the Ottomans actively participat-
ed in the evolution of military architecture to 
adapt it to the use of artillery, as did European 
powers such as the kingdoms of France, Spain 





 For a description of Rumeli Hisarı see: Ga-
briel, 1943, pp. 29-75; Ayverdi, 1989, pp. 626-
660). 
2
 For a description of Anadolu Hisarı see: Ga-
briel, 1943, pp. 9-28; Ayverdi, 1966, pp. 501-
506; 1989, pp. 617-624. 
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